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
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SHOULD THE UNITED STATES ARMY HAVE A PROFESSIONAL GENERAL STAFF?

BY


COLONEL BRADLEY H. PETERSEN, JR.

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With the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, on 1 October 1986, the United States Military faces the greatest reorganization challenge to its leadership structure since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, with its amendments, abolished the Army War Department and its General Staff and created the Department of Defense. This study seeks to examine some of the forces and reasons behind the 1986 Act. It also explores the design of the Prussian/German, Russian/Soviet, and U.S. Army War Department General Staffs. The purpose behind exploring the background and Methodology underlying these General Staff systems is: To shed some light upon, and perhaps dispell, some of the myths, superstitions, misconceptions, and apprehensions concerning the whole concept of the General Staff; To examine the methods used to select, train, educate, and manage General Staff Officers; To illustrate that the concept of the General Staff is not foreign to the U.S. Army; To look at the demanding standards used for selecting, training, and educating the General Staff Officers of our chief military competition in the Soviet Union; And finally, the study attempts to highlight some of the problems in the present American system, draw some conclusions, and provide an answer to the question posed by the title in the form of some recommendations.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES ARMY HAVE A PROFESSIONAL GENERAL STAFF
INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

BY

Colonel Bradley H. Petersen Jr., AF

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Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17015
23 March 1987

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The question being asked here involves professionalism as opposed to amateurism. It is not asking whether the U.S. Army or defense establishment should have a "Great General Staff" with command authority on the Soviet or pre World War II German Army model. Although I believe a serious study in that area is needed and would be very timely, I have chosen to attempt to eat the bear one bite at a time. For this reason also I am not going to address in detail the question of professional general staff officers in the other services but intend to restrict myself to the Army.

The question of a "Great General Staff" is wrapped in too much misinformation, superstition, and emotion to be adequately addressed in a study of this scope. In addition, and in part due to the above, the National Security Act of 1947 states that the Department of Defense is; "to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their intergration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general

staff."¹ The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 retains this prohibition.² The perceived inability of the Joint Chiefs and their staffs to accomplish their mission brought about reform in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which gives more authority to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and requires specially managed joint staff officers, but still falls short of creating a true professional general staff with executive authority.³

For a history of the German General Staff, two works available in English are, Walter Görlitz's, History of the German General Staff 1657 - 1945,⁴ and Col. T.N. Dupuy's, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff 1807 - 1945.⁵

I do not intend to address organization. Most governments and defense establishments have evolved or adopted more or less efficient Weberian style bureaucracies in order to carry out their missions. More importantly, "wiring diagrams" seldom tell us much about how business is really accomplished. All potential threat and free world forces are privy to or in possession of the latest and as a rule sound tactical and operational doctrine. They all understand and appreciate the realities of the modern battlefield. they all possess modern highly mobile, highly destructive weapons. The only thing differentiating them in effectiveness is their ability to translate this doctrine into action, that is an operational capability, with their troops and equipment.

BACKGROUND

But why even ask the question, "Should the U.S. Army have a professional general staff"? There have been enough articles written and studies conducted since the Vietnam War which claim that all is not well with the U.S. Army that it would pay to take notice and do some objective self examination. Perhaps the 1968 version of FM 100-5 said it best on page 5-2; "Combat power is a combination of the physical means available to a commander and the moral strength of his command. It is meaningful only in relation to the combat power of the opposing force."⁶ The Soviets are our most dangerous potential opposing force. The Soviets also have a very educated, proficient, and doctrinally prolific professional general staff.

In the opening paragraph of chapter one in his book, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, Colonel Harry Summers, Jr., quotes General Fred C. Weyand as saying; "The American Army really is a people's Army in the sense that it belongs to the American people who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement."⁷ This may help to explain why so many outside the military have come out strongly for reform in the military. The American people believe they invest relatively large amounts in

their military and therefore have the right to expect comenserate returns on their investment when it comes time to use it. The record from Korea and Vietnam, from Son Tay, Pueblo, Mayaguez, and Desert One to Beirut is not one to give the American people warm feelings concerning those with whom they have intrusted their defense and survival. Samuel P. Huntington asked a very relevant question, "Is American military incompetence since World War II any greater than it was earlier in our history?"⁸ He says, "Looking back over American military history, one can find repeated instances of strategic blindness, tactical stupidity, gross deficiencies in training and dicipline, incompetent and vainglorious leadership, and sheer cowardice. One can also find many instances of just the opposite."⁹ He goes on to say; "It would, however, be hard to make the case that war and the military arts have been a sector of human activity where Americans have distinguished themselves compared to other peoples."¹⁰ The difference is, however, that it is only since World War II that the American people have raised and maintained a large professional standing army in peacetime. It is also only since World War II that a threat has existed capable of destroying the United States and her very way of life. In short the old ways wouldn't wash. America's military had to grow up.

THE MILITARY REFORMERS

In 1972, Stuart H. Loory advocated restructuring the Defense Department to, "abolish the ineffectual Joint Chiefs of Staff," and replacing them with, "a Joint General Staff," who would, "be completely separated from their service," and "would even wear a separate and distinctive uniform."¹¹ Gabriel and Savage's Crisis in Command was one of the most widely read works of the 1970s which seriously questioned professionalism within the U.S. Army.¹² Many of our military problems may be caused by still unsolved, or unsolvable, political problems. This area is not, however, the military's concern.

Edward N. Luttwak's comments on staff work at the level of the Joint Chiefs and his proposed solution for a "new cadre of national defense officers"¹³ to be taken from the services is of interest. Mr. Luttwak proposes "officers of middle-high rank who have already filled staff and command positions and who have been selected for early promotion by their own service would be given the opportunity to start a new career as national-defense officers - if they pass stiff entrance examinations and survive demanding interviews."¹⁴

Mr. Jeffrey Record makes a convincing argument that the U.S. Military is and has been in good shape at the tactical level and

is finally starting to think and plan at the operational level,¹⁵ but is still woefully inadequate at the strategic level. He praises the much needed recognition for substantial improvement in the US military's operational performance, but laments the apparent lack of recognition that the same kind of intellectual force needs to be directed at the strategic level. He states; "The reformers are no less right in pointing to the German army as an inspiring model of operational effectiveness. From Koniggratz to the Kiev cauldron, the German army routinely outperformed its opponents on the battlefield. And whereas Germany's enemies occasionally produced a brilliant field commander--an Allenby, a Brusilov, a Zhukov, a Patton, a MacArthur, or an O'Connor--the Generalstab system yielded an assemblage of operational talent¹⁶ unparalleled in any other modern Military."

Mr. Record says the Germans lost despite this operational¹⁷ brilliance because of strategic incompetence. There is much to indicate that the German General Staff was dragged into a war they¹⁸ strongly opposed and knew Germany was not ready for by Hitler. How much of strategy is determined by the military and how much by the civilian leadership is an open question. Colonel Ralph L. Allen has made the point this way. "National strategy which we might call the 'art of the civilian,' will determine how the elements of national power will be used to secure national objectives. Military strategy, 'the art of generals,' is but one part of the national strategy. Military strategy is developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by the National Command Authority, and

passed in the form of strategic goals or objectives to the various theater commanders." ¹⁹ This also appears to have largely been the case in Germany, except that for much of the war Hitler did not allow the General Staff to develop and implement military strategy, where the officer corps was even more apolitical than our own.

Commendable as the revitalization of thinking at the operational level in the US Military is, it must be recognized that it is late in arriving and is still in its infantile stages. There exists, as of now, no real operational doctrine worth the name in the US Army. Very little thought has been given to the difference between tactical and operational weapons systems and their design and employment. American military publications have not been involved in debates over whether Attack Helicopters are operational or tactical weapons systems, concepts of operational mobility v. tactical mobility, whether operational artillery should be towed and tactical artillery self propelled, when the operational reserve should be committed and how one knows, and numerous similar questions. Until much of this type debate takes place and is answered it appears the military will continue having problems with Concept Based Requirements and that the Soviets will continue doing comparatively better in this area.

A Strategic study on Mobilization in 1984 listed among its conclusions the following; "mobilization or the RC has never been adequately planned. Mobilization planning has been generally nonexistent, and in cases when some plans were prepared, they were

based on grossly faulty assumptions. A result has been the conduct of mobilization having the same errors, problems, and inefficiencies as previous mobilizations. It is embarrassing at best and disgusting at worst to realize that the US Army must relearn the lessons from past mobilizations upon each new one.²⁰ This is a heavy indictment considering that FM 100-1 clearly stresses that; "In national security planning, US active and reserve component forces and allied forces are conceived as an entity, the Total Force."²¹ We plan to fight as Joint and Combined forces with our reserve forces as an integral part of the whole. One of the prime functions of any general staff is planning for war and the mobilization necessary to fight a war. In addition it is a general staff's task to come up with a theory of modern war and a concept for fighting it.

THE GERMANS AND THE RUSSIANS

Among the greatest achievements of the Prussian-German General staff was a theory of modern war developed according to the demands of the time.²² Among the large number of German General Staff theoreticians who tried to unveil the mystery of war stand names such as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Clausewitz, Moltke, Schlieffen, and Guderian.

Although development of military doctrine may have progressed

in an uneven fashion since the early days of the Soviet State, it has occupied a far higher place there than in the U.S. Military. And, in contrast to many U.S. military officers, the Soviets appear to take it very seriously.

"Textbooks used at Soviet military and higher military schools show an emphasis on the art of war that is not found in U.S. Military institutions."²³ "The professional Soviet officer who is likely to be promoted to the rank of full colonel or general will have studied the art of war far more intensively than comparable officers in the U.S. Military forces."²⁴

Although, by western standards, Soviet works on "Military Art" are often not objective or balanced and are generally highly political, many of these works are highly profound and, in some cases, far ahead of contemporary western thought.²⁵ Probably not since Mahan has comparable military thought of such quality been produced in the United States Military forces.

Works such as M.B. Shaposhnikov's, The Brain of the Army, M.V. Frunze's, A Unified Military Doctrine for the Red Army, M.N. Tukhachevskiz's, Tactics and Strategy, and, What is new in the Development of Red Army Tactics, are excellent works and were often far ahead of their time.

In addition to these earlier works "the Soviet drive for superpower status has coincided with an outpouring of Soviet Military writing perhaps unsurpassed both in quantity and quality."²⁶ Among these works could be listed Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy's, Military Strategy, Colonel M.P. Serdo's, The

People, The Army, The Commander, and Admiral S.G. Gorehkov's, The
²⁷
Sea Power of the State. In addition to these I would mention V.D. Sokolovskii's, The Revolution in Military Affairs, A.A. Sidorenko's, The Offensive, and V.YE. Savkin's, Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics. These are just a few and are probably not even the most profound as most truly important works are classified in the closed Soviet system. Most of these works are the products of General Staff officers or of the Academy of the General Staff.

All of this work has provided the Soviets with a well thought out and comprehensive body of Military Doctrine. "The Soviets consider their Military Doctrine to be one of their greatest assets. It is the concentration and distillation of military wisdom and experience and is constantly being refined, ammended²⁸ and improved by experiment, exercise and reevaluation." Whereas the U.S. Army is just beginning to struggle with the concept of "Operational Art" and has no real doctrine for it, the Soviets have, for a long time, been in possession of well thought out and tested operational doctrine, weapons systems and concepts.

The U.S. Military has seemingly abdicated deep conceptual theoretical thinking to the "Beltway Bandits." "With few exceptions, Soviet publications on military affairs are written by officers. In contrast, much of the most influential military writing in the United States is by civilians, most of whome have²⁹ never seen military duty." Much of the "Military Reform Movement" is also from the civilian sector.

~

"Soviet strategists are perhaps without contemporary equal in providing theoretical insights into the nature of war and its specific aspects. It would be difficult to find any book written in the past two decades by an officer in the United States armed forces that matches the level of Marshal Sokolovskiy's, Military Strategy, General Reznichenko's, Tactics, or Colonel Sidorenko's, The Offensive.³⁰ This allows the Soviets to truly practice a Concept Based Requirements system, among other things. "Theory in the Soviet Union is ahead of actual capability. In the military area it is intended to be so."³¹ To be fair to U.S. officers this may not be all their fault. U.S. Army officers receive less formal military schooling than those of other modern western armies.³² Most successful U.S. Army officers spend about three years attending formal military schools in the course of a career.³³ A senior Soviet officer, on the other hand, who has attended a school at each level will have received from 11- to 15-years of formal military schooling by the time he completes the two-year Military Academy of the General Staff in the grade of lieutenant colonel, colonel, or general major [one star].³⁴

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CHAPTER 2

THE PRUSSIAN/GERMAN GENERAL STAFF

What makes this General Staff different from that of the General Staffs of many other nations, many of which were copies of the German staff?

Col. T. N. Dupuy says, he found in the course of his research concerning World War II, that: "On the average, a force of 100 Germans was the combat equivalent of 120 Americans or 120 British troops."¹ This translated to- "a 20 percent combat effectiveness superiority."²

Col. Dupuy ask himself why this occurred. In answer he says: "I am convinced - and will seek to show - that the Germans. uniquely discovered the secret of institutionalizing military excellence."³ The Five Reformers," Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Grolman, Boyen, and Clausewitz succeeded in institutionalizing military excellence in the form of The General Staff.

They believed this necessary because, "ordinary generals and ordinary armies cannot easily defeat a genius even when his army is not as good as theirs. But an operational genius, leading an army created by an organizational genius is virtually invincible."⁴

But naturally occurring geniuses are scarce and hard to come by, so they created the best possible army in peacetime [organizational excellence] and created a General Staff of carefully selected, well trained and educated officers to advise the commanders in wartime [operational excellence].⁵

So far so good. This tells us some of the "why" and "what," but not the all important "how."

How do you create a smoothly functioning system which automatically selects and promotes competence? How does one make "the brains of the army" an "aristocracy of intellect rather than birth,"⁶ that can perpetuate military excellence through the vagaries of change?

GENERAL STAFF DEFINITION

What is a General Staff? Col. Dupuy defines it as follows:

"A General Staff is a highly trained, carefully selected group of military generalists whose function in peace or war is to assist the nation's military leadership - or a general commanding a field force of combined arms elements - in planning, controlling, directing, coordinating, and supervising the activities of all military subordinate elements in the most effective possible, mutually supporting efforts to achieve an

assigned goal or objective, or in maximum readiness to undertake such efforts. The leader or leadership makes decisions and gives commands; the General Staff's responsibility is to provide all possible support to assure that the decisions and commands are timely, sound, and effective."⁷

He then puts forward some criteria necessary to the production of such a staff by the Germans. They are;

- selection
- examination
- specialized training
- historical study
- initiative
- responsibility
- technical and tactical perfection
- objectivity
- regeneration and
- a leavening process.⁸

The "Great General Staff" changed many times during its existence from 1807 to 1945. Many of these changes were in organization and form, not in substance. While the "Great General Staff" technically ends with the German defeat in May of 1945, the Bundeswehr continues the practice of a professional General Staff in the form of the "Fuhrungsstab." The Bundeswehr differs from the

old General Staff in that it has no command authority over the field forces, these are all under NATO command, and that it is an Armed Forces General Staff, not simply an Army General Staff as the old staff was.⁹ The position of the Chief of Staff in command and control practice has been laid down in the "blankenese Directive" of 1970 and the "planning Directive" of 1983.¹⁰ Although the Chief of Staff is not included in the chain of command between the Minister of Defense and the armed forces, his planning responsibility commits him to develop the structure, organization, command and control, education, training and equipment of the armed forces.¹¹ But for this very reason, i.e. it more closely resembles the U.S. model, it is valuable for study.

Limiting this study by not going into organization does not mean that organization has no role to play in how effective a staff is. While it may not matter if one calls an operations officer the Ia or G3, it is important that the organizational structure provide for performance at a high level of proficiency. In order to do this the organization of the German General Staff, like that of our own, changed numerous times to meet the realities of the environment in which it existed.

Some things remained rather constant. The organization into a "Grosser Generalstab" and "Truppengeneralstab" remained a fairly constant system. This facilitated the regular transfer of General Staff officers between the "Great General Staff" and General Staff positions with the field forces. This kept the General Staff officers in touch with the field army and expanded their influence

with it. Another thing that has remained fairly constant is the method of selecting, training, educating and developing General Staff officers.

SCREENING AND SELECTION

"The officers of the German General Staff were the elite of the Army, carefully selected through a process far more rigorous and deliberate than that of any other army."¹²

Dr. Waldemar Erfurth, General of Infantry, General Staff officer, author and historian explains how the screening and selection process went. He claims that the organization of the General Staff rested upon two pillars, "painstaking selection and thorough, carefully conducted training."¹³

Of about 1000 applying each year for the War College only a very few (some 80-90) were actually accepted as a result of their entrance examinations.¹⁴ But as General of Cavalry, Siegfried Westphal says;

"The results of the military area examinations were by no means the sole factor deciding the selection. More important was the regimental commander's hearty recommendation of the candidate for General Staff assignment, with regard to his complete qualifications as a line officer as well as his character traits.

This requirement was designed to guarantee that only competent line officers of unsullied character would be assigned to the General Staff. The character proviso in particular, elicited the keenest interest of the Army Personnel Officer. The author remembers instances when inquiries were made about unfavorable marks in efficiency reports dating back for years, and that men assigned to assistant chief of staff training were turned down because of trivial 'infractions of conduct.'¹⁵

General Erfurth continues:

"This selective process was continued at the end of the three - year training period at the war college, since only about half the students were found fit to be accepted by the General Staff school. Of these again only about half were transferred into the General Staff after two years of training. Consequently, of roughly 1000 officers starting out in the contest, at the end of five training years only some fifteen or twenty were left who had reached their goal."¹⁶

But it didn't end there. Upon graduation and being pronounced fit for assignment to the General Staff, the now designated assistant chief of staff, was transferred for probationary service in the General Staff for a period of one to one and a half years. The length of this probationary period has varied depending on the historical period in question, peace or war, and the length of the

war college courses. The General Staff course at the war collage has generally run between two and three years, with the three year course generally being considered the ideal. The probationary service period was standerd practice until World War I, was discontinued in the 100,000 - man Richswehr, reintroduced in 1934, and only recently discontinued again by the Bundeswehr.¹⁷ While this practice was in effect, it was only upon satisfactory completion of this probationary period that the officer was accepted as a General Staff Officer and allowed to wear the General Staff Insignia.

While some disagree with probation as an unnecessary and ineffective additional hardship, others strongly support the system. General Westphal makes the point that it is important for the field commanders under whom the new assistant chief of staff works to be heard. He says; "it is by no means an established fact that an individual who had good marks in theoretical subjects at the war college would automatically prove his worth in actual General Staff practice, for the sake of a really effective selection and a continued screening one is bound to agree with the above mentioned procedure."¹⁸

The new General Staff officers were normally assigned initially to the Greater General Staff in Berlin or at corps headquarters as Ia or Ic (assistant chief of staff for operations or intelligence). After a two year tour of duty in these positions they were assigned to the line for a two year tour of duty followed immediately by another posting to the Greater General

Staff. Upon successful completion of this assignment he was normally posted as Ia (operations officer, G3) of a division.

"Then the process of selection again began to function. Not all General Staff officers were considered qualified to take over the functions of a Ia at corps headquarters, and only a small number of those who were so considered, and not until they had successfully passed their assignments as battalion commanders, as chief of staff of an army corps or as section chief in the Greater General Staff."¹⁹

It should be pointed out here that in the old Prussian-Imperial German system the "Troop General Staff" positions were restricted to a chief of staff and two assistants²⁰ at each corps and one General Staff officer in each division, the Ia. This served to keep the General Staff small and select as well as preventing its members monopolizing promotions at higher levels of responsibility. The system has since expanded to the point that in the Bundeswehr today there are two General Staff billets in each brigade.²¹

Expansion of the General Staff creates some problems in that exceptional quality is harder to maintain and the General Staff officers begin to monopolize promotions. Despite this a two track system is still operational in the Bundeswehr. Command tours are generally shorter for General Staff officers, normally two years, compared to five or even seven years as battalion commander for

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
troop officers. In this context one must understand that in many areas the Bundeswehr is not as officer heavy as the U.S. and Soviet Armies. For example, instead of four or five lieutenants in a company the German Army normally has only one, who is understudy to the company commander. Most platoons are commanded by senior NCOs. This has an advantage in having platoons lead by seasoned soldiers and also prevents the extreme pyramiding of officers at higher ranks. Command is the only time a General Staff officer reverts to wearing his original branch color.

Selection of General Staff officers differs somewhat in the Bundeswehr from the practice of the pre-war armies. In the 7th year of service all officers undertake a rigorous one-year self study program in their units called the Tactical Professional Training Program [TATP]. This program is capped by a two week examination. The TATP is controlled and administered by the division chief of staff who must write a detailed evaluation on each officer.

During the 8th year of commissioned service senior captains are assigned to the Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr for the Field Grade Officer Qualification and Selection Course[FQSC]. This is an intense three and one half month course of evaluations and student presentations which all officers must pass in order to be promoted to the rank of major.

The top graduates of the FQSC will be considered for attendance at the thirty-month long General Staff Officer Course [GSOC] of the Fuhrungsakademie.²² Selection of the very best 40 Army

Structure of the Field Grade Officer Education



officers (25 for the Air Force and 12 for the Navy), regardless of branch, for attendance at the GSOC is based upon; (a). performance in the TATP and comments and written recommendation by the chief of staff and the officers commander, (b). his last three efficiency reports which must all be outstanding, and (c). class standing at the FQSC.²³

While consistently seeking the "aristocracy of intellect" the Germans have always attempted to weed out the overly ambitious and arrogant. The traits fostered have been valor and veracity, critical judgment, objectivity and intellectual versatility, personal force and self control, sound self-esteem, and those noble qualities characteristic of all great leaders.²⁴

The drive to combine these ethically high qualifications with the intellectual capabilities necessary to achieve the highest martial spirit and ability, together with a spirit of self-denial and pride only in serving, is responsible for some of the well known mottos of the General Staff:²⁵

"The General Staff officer has no name." - von SEECKT.

"Be more than you appear to be." - von SCHLIEFFEN.

"Accomplish much, remain in the background." - von MOLTKE.

"Genius is work." - von SCHLIEFFEN.

Most General Staff officers were selected from the combat arms. As General Fortsch puts it, ... "the officers originating from the main branches of the service were superior to those

originating from the special branches. Even in war, the latter did not have the necessary insight into tactical leadership.²⁶ Of these combat arms officers about half came from the infantry and a high percentage were said to have come from the artillery due to the overall high quality of officers in this branch. Later, as the new motorized and armored branches gained in size more and more General Staff officers came from these branches. No officer was said to have ever been accepted as a result of pull but only because of his own demonstrated ability.²⁷

"The completely nonpartisan selection of General Staff officers was so widely known and so undisputed that it was considered an established fact and never even discussed."²⁸

Efficiency reports for General Staff officers were always filled out by their immediate superiors and reviewed by the next higher superior. In the case of officers assigned to troop units, the divisional commanders or the chiefs of staff at army corps or army group headquarters rated. It was a standing rule that the corps commander would review the reports of all General Staff officers in each corps command. All efficiency reports on General Staff officers were collected at the central branch of the Army General Staff, where they were evaluated and submitted to the Army Chief of Staff.²⁹

EXAMINATION

Of the six foreign armies examined in the RETO study Israel, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

"Examinations for promotion to captain and/or major, or for entrance into command and staff colleges, are required in all the foreign armies in this study. The prospect of examinations (combined with rather formal professional development systems in the Canadian and British Armies) places a heavy self-study burden on junior officers in these foreign armies. Only the U.S. Army does not test its officers..."³⁰

In the Reichswehr the Truppenamt published the names of officers each September who were to take the Military Area Examination the following March. These officers were given correspondence course problems in the areas they would later be tested. These areas were applied and theoretical tactics, terrain, ordnance, history, economics, geography, and civics. The study of a foreign language was also required and would be tested but the officer could select the language himself.³¹

These officers were given time to prepare and do the careful and methodical study necessary if one was to do well on the

examination, never-the-less, a great amount of the officers own time and energy was required.

Military Area headquarters assigned experienced General Staff officers and experts to carry out all the preparatory work and administer the examinations.

"The examination problems were uniformly fixed for the entire Army by the Reichswehr Ministry."³² They took place at military district headquarters at the same date and time to preclude any possibility of compromise or collusion. The total examination consisted of a written portion on the subjects previously listed, requiring a detailed solution to each question, for example students were given two and a half hours for each tactical problem, plus a Physical fitness and language test.

"The examination papers were corrected and evaluated by specially detailed General Staff officers and experts according to directives issued by the Reichswehr Ministry. In order to preclude any possibility of unfair rating, the examinees did not write their names on their examination papers but used a coded key number given them by the Reichswehr Ministry. This system was so unobjectionable that in the Reichswehr there was never raised even the slightest criticism about unfair ratings."³³

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Unlike the U.S. Army, responsibility for officer training and education resided not with a German equivalent to TRADOC but, with the General Staff.

"Responsibility for officer education would give to the General Staff control over the preparation of young officers for staff and command positions, and thus facilitate the selection of the most promising of these for the General Staff. It would also assure the Staff that training and doctrine were fully consistent with war planning." ³⁴

There is no intention here to go into a detailed explanation of the entire German officer education system. That would be beyond the scope of this study, which is only concerned with the special training of General Staff officers, and is therefore not all relevant. A comparison of officer education systems can be found in volume 3 of the 5 volume RETO study.³⁵ It is not my intent to get into an in depth study of Programs of Instruction (POI), as they tell one very little beyond what general subjects are taught.

A POI, like an organizational chart, is only useful if one knows how it operates, i.e., what is actually taught, in what detail, and with what precision. The most important aspect, the quality of the instructor and his method of instruction, is not to be found in a POI. When all is said and done, the end product is probably the best measure one can use.

The Germans constantly strove to provide the best officers available as instructors to the War College. In this they generally experienced the same problems, successes and frustrations most armies have in this endeavor.

Not all German General Staff officers were nor are great thinkers, scientific luminaries, nor prolific publishers, but the cultural level of the German General Staff, taken as a whole, has remained exceptionally high.

In training and educating future General Staff officers, a three- year long General Staff Academy was widely believed to be about the minimum essential to produce an exceptional product.³⁶ At times, usually due to time or other resource constraints, the time has had to be shortened, as it presently is, at 30 months, in the Bundeswehr. But, this has usually been by necessity rather than preference and is considered by some to be far from the ideal. General Westphal says that with a cutback to a two-year curriculum "it was virtually impossible to obtain really outstanding General Staff officers."³⁷

Tactics and operations received the heaviest emphasis at the War College, but military history, logistics, administration, and

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command and control, as well as study of a foreign language, of the students choice, was also provided. Particular stress was paid to the ability to judge quickly a situation and make decisions. Most important was a highly perfected technique of issuing commands that were terse yet complete.

School solutions were, and still are today, avoided. The object of the War College has always been to; "teach HOW to think, not WHAT to think."³⁸ Model orders and school approved solutions were not be employed.

"Critical judgment is a matter of training. To overcome the problem of arrogance is a problem of education. To recognize the enemy, see through his plans and take into consideration all resulting consequences for oneself, even the most disadvantageous ones, is a subject of military training. To strengthen one's will, to increase one's self-confidence and the belief in one's own powers is a very important problem of education. Realistic thinking, facing facts without any illusions or untruthfulness, is a matter of intellectual training."³⁹

Before the war, academic instruction was normally conducted four days a week with a staff ride or tactical field problem on the fifth day. Eight- to fourteen-day staff rides to more distant areas were conducted at intervals throughout the academic year. In the summers, 30 June to 1 October, officers were detailed out to other branches and services for on-the-job training and

experience.⁴⁰

A sample three-year program recommended by General Fortsch looks about as follows;

FIRST YEAR - Division and regimental studies.

SECOND YEAR - Corps and army level, with repetition of some division level study.

THIRD YEAR - Total armed forces (joint) study. Command problems with the Army, Navy, and Air Force and oversees commands (combined).

Instruction in military history and foreign language would continue through all three years.⁴¹

At this point a brief explanation of the current German officer training and education program may be in order.

As a general rule most German officer applicants are graduates of a Gymnasium and possess an Abitur, roughly equivalent to a Junior College degree in the U.S. After initial screening those deemed to have the potential undergo two and one-half days of testing at the Officer testing center in Cologne.⁴²

Those finally selected are sent to a basic training unit, of the branch into which they are to be commissioned, for three months. Next the officer aspirants are assigned to their branch school for a six-month course. Upon completion of this course the aspirants are administered the Officers' examination. Those who do

well are eligible to become regular officers.⁴³

The next phase is Unit Training during which the candidates will be trained and licensed on all vehicles in their branch. Following this phase the officer aspirants are assigned as trainers in a basic training battalion which provides recruits to their unit. During this quarter they are assigned and evaluated as leaders of squad-sized units. Having proven their leadership potential, they are transferred to one of the two Armed Forces Universities where they will spend three years and three months studying for a degree. From this study the candidate will earn a Diplom, the equivalent of a Master's Degree in the U.S. Failure means serving ones time as an NCO. Failure rates run 30% to 50%. The successful candidate is promoted to Second Lieutenant on the third anniversary of his entry into the Army.⁴⁴

Following commissioning the officer is sent to a four and one-half month Army Officer School followed by a three and one-half month Branch Basic course. This is normally followed by a 2 - 3 year troop assignment. Officers selected to command companies return to their branch schools for a one month command course.⁴⁵

As already stated, during their 7th year they will undergo the TATP, and in their 8th year all regular officers attend the Junior Staff Course (FQSC). Of these, about 10% attend the General Staff Officers Course (GSOC). The Bundeswehr currently has no senior service school equivalent to the U.S. Army War College.⁴⁶

Historically, the military education of General Staff

officers has usually continued beyond the Kriegsakademie. In addition to war games and annual maneuvers, a two-week staff ride and a problem provided by the Chief of Staff was normally required of all senior General Staff officers. The staff problem required detailed work and had to be returned to the Chief of Staff for evaluation and use. As in all armies, day to day events and normal duties often impacted upon and interfered with these requirements.

German General Staff officers usually worked far longer hours and received far fewer outward signs of recognition than their comrades in the troop units. The German Army has historically given decorations only in time of war and for gallantry in action. Most of these went to field troops and their commanders. The General Staff officer had to be content in the knowledge of, and pride in, his contributions to the Army. He was the servant of his commander and his troops and often knew no real life of his own. He required, "qualities all his own which combined a harmonious blending of the heart and mind, splendid idealism, a large degree of self-denial, tactful self-control, the faculty to feel content to live out of the limelight notwithstanding a knowledge of his own merits, and such a sense of responsibility as would make him feel amply rewarded with a gradually increased reliance on him."⁴⁷

Col. Dupuy sums up the unique qualities of the German General Staff well when he says;

"The Germans had no monopoly on an understanding of military

theory, or an ability to analyze operational experience. Nor did they have a monopoly on military competence. But what they did have was a monopoly on consistently reliable and excellent performance throughout the army and in accordance with doctrine and theory."⁴⁸

..."The only significant military professional development in Prussia and Germany that was not matched in these other countries was the creation of the Prussian, later German, General Staff, and the special qualities of professionalism that differentiated that General Staff from imitations in all other nations."⁴⁹

ENDNOTES

1. Col. T.N. Dupuy, A Genius for War, p.4.
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5. Ibid, p.26.
6. Ibid, p.28.
7. Ibid, p.48.
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9. German Federal Minister of Defense, White Paper, The Situation and Development of the Federal Armed Forces, (Bonn, The Federal Minister of Defense, June 19, 1985), p.169.
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11. Ibid, p.169.
12. Col. T.N. Dupuy, p.303.
13. Dr. Waldemar Erfurth, "Training and Development of German General Staff Officers," Project 6, Vol.V, p.27.
14. Ibid, p.28.
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16. Erfurth, p.28.
17. Westphal, p.19.
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24. Hermann Fortsch, "Training and Development of German General Staff Officers," Project 6, Vol. VIII, p.11.

25. Erfurth, pp. 33,34,&38.

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29. Ibid, p.21.

30. RETO study, p.H-1-56.

31. Westphal, pp.2-5.

32. Ibid, p.4.

33. Ibid, p.4.

34. Dupuy, p.113.

35. RETO study, Vol. 3, The Data Base, Annex H--Other Armies.

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42. U.S. Department of the Army, Technical Report, T-22-80, Education and Training of the German Army Officer, (United States Training and Doctrine Command Liason Office, German General Army Office, Cologne, Germany, June 30, 1980), pp.1-4.

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44. Ibid, pp.1-4.

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CHAPTER 3

THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN/SOVIET GENERAL STAFF

HISTORY

The ancestry of the modern Soviet Armed Forces General Staff could be traced back to the Imperial Russian military reforms, undertaken under the direction of Dmitrii Alexeyevich Milutin (1816-1912), during the 1860s as a result of the lessons learned from the Crimean War.¹

The Russian General Staff, "Glavnye Shtab" or "Main Staff," existed prior to the 1860s. It was narrow and one-sided however and could not be considered a true General Staff in the modern sense of the term. It had no control over officer or troop training, supply and logistics, weapons nor equipment. It dealt only with command and control and operations. A military academy to train Main Staff officers existed, it was opened in 1832, but it also was very narrow in scope.²

Beginning in 1863, Minister of War Milyutin, seeking to better align theory and practice created the Main Administration

of the General Staff (Glavnoe Upravlenie General'nogo Shtaba: GUGSh) which incorporated the Military-Topographical Depot with the Main Staff and placed the military academy under its control. In 1865 he fused the GUGSh with the Main Staff. He centralized his control over army personnel, deployment, force structure, education, and operations. The new General Staff, as the operations arm, dealt with military organization, mobilization, training, and intelligence as well as the planning for and conduct of war.³

The education and training of new staff officers was given particular attention. In 1869 the military academy was given the designation of the Imperial Nikolaevskii Academy of the General Staff with a course of study three years in duration.⁴

Much of the Russian General Staff system was very similar to, if not copied directly from, the Prussian. The Russians had, however, some unique problems of their own which do not seem to have been encountered, at least not to the same degree, by the Prussians. These limited, and in some cases almost negated, the effectiveness of much of the Russian system. Some of these problem areas were difficult to overcome and persisted into World War II. The very poor educational level of the Russian People and of the soldiers and officers, as a whole, mandated that education in the army begin on a very basic level. The strict caste system and the advantages that birth and social standing provided were difficult to overcome and caused bitter class divisions. The Russian bureaucracy had a tradition of corruption and inefficiency, which

compounded by a poor but rapidly changing economy, and primitive transportation and communications networks, provided Russian staffs with a challenge not encountered by their Prussian counterparts.

In Imperial Russia industrialization, urbanization, and rising educational standards produced severe tensions between society and the regime. Growing professionalism in the officer corps of the Imperial Army brought into being a new caste based on education and ability, which contributed to the erosion and the undermining of the social and political order in its own way.⁵ The Imperial Russian regime never succeeded in harnessing these forces to strengthen the state. The Soviets seem to have learned this lesson, and after initial heated and often violent struggle, have succeeded in harnessing this professionalism to strengthen the regime.

"And at the heart of this professionalism lies the General Staff, the apotheosis of professionalism and the institutionalization of expertise par excellence, at once an institution and a professional elite in its own right, a planning agency, and a command instrument which has latterly assumed managerial functions."⁶

But this all lay in the future, in Imperial Russia even recruitment of officers to form a professional General Staff presented difficulties. The poor educational level of the officer

corps as a whole was compounded by the difficulty in setting up an effective school system due to the mistrust on the part of the regime of books, and education in general, as having subversive potential. Although education gradually came to be viewed as a key to success, it never fully succeeded in overcoming social distinctions and in some cases it reinforced them, nevertheless, "ability by and large put a man in the General Staff Academy."⁷

Passing a rigorous entrance examination, a strong commanders recommendation, and having served at least four years in a line formation was required before one could be considered for admission to the Academy. General Denikin described the entry process to the General Staff Academy as "a trial" where potential applicants were turned into ascetics, "bent over books on military science and general subjects -- languages, mathematics, history, and geography."⁸

The General Staff Academy entrance examination was administered by the staffs of the Military Districts. The overall numbers selected corresponded somewhat to the Prussian/German experience. About 48 officers would end up being assigned to the General Staff each year of some fifteen hundred who initially entered their names for the examination.⁹

Of the approximately fifteen hundred officers who initially entered their names for the examination, only 400-500 would be selected to take the examination, of these 140-150 would gain admission to the Academy. Of this group 100 may graduate after two years as "first class" students and go on to the "supplementary

course" from which only half again were selected for the General Staff.¹⁰

As in the German experience, Artillerymen and Engineers normally did well thanks to their generally high educational level. In Russia most General Staff officers, regardless of branch, came from the Guards due to their generally higher educational standards. As a branch the Infantry usually suffered the heaviest attrition rate due to their poorer overall education level.¹¹

Once on the General Staff the officer was required, by regulation, to be rotated between troop units and the General Staff, much like the Prussian/German model. But here the Russians didn't quite pull it off. The regulations were generally not observed which resulted in a loss of contact between line and staff. It also resulted in General Staff officers assuming command at higher levels without the experience of command at lower levels. This lack of operational experience caused real weaknesses at the top.¹²

Regardless of its other problems the Russian General Staff did succeed in becoming the "brain of the army" and were highly respected. It was during the period of the 1890s that Russian General Staff officers begin the exploration of operations which were to lead to the theory of "operational art."¹³

With the disintegration of Russian Society in 1917 the old Imperial Army and General Staff ceased to exist. However, reality triumphed over pure ideology and the new Soviet rulers found it

necessary to employ many Imperial officers and the officers of the Imperial General Staff to fight off the enemies of the revolution and the new Soviet State.

"The Red Army was eventually built on the bones of the old Imperial Army, fleshed out with men conscripted to the Bolshevik colors and furnished with a 'brain' consisting of none other than erstwhile 'Genshtabistyis' who manned the several staffs."¹⁴

The formation of the modern Soviet military machine and its General Staff was a slow and very painful process. This is not the place to go into that tragic history in any detail and only a few points vital to understanding today's Soviet Armed Forces General Staff will have to suffice. When all was said and done much of what exists today is based directly on the Imperial model and experience.

In May of 1918, compulsory military service was reintroduced and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR) was established in September, as the new supreme military organ, in place of the old "Stavka."¹⁵ In November a new academy to train Red Army staff officers was in operation at a very basic level. A Field Staff was established responsible for field operations, manning, and training. A special staff, the "Vserosglivshtab: (VGSh)," was made responsible for all "central agencies." From these, in 1921, a Red Army Staff (Shtab RKKA) was formed and its organization confirmed by a decree of 25 May 1922.¹⁶

The General Staff Academy was redesignated the Military Academy of the Red Army, with M.N. Tukhachevskii at its head, by an order of 5 August 1921 and all military academies were placed under the Commander in Chief.¹⁷

In 1924 M.V. Frunze was appointed Chief of Staff and began instituting sweeping military-educational changes. These changes were designed to increase ideological awareness, improve courses, provide for close contact with troop life, bring about unified military command, and ensure that Marxism was the guiding principle of military science. Frunze brought the best, most experienced commanders in as faculty to the Academy. He abolished the old Imperial junior and senior course and instituted a component course.¹⁸

"The 1st course should treat tactics of the various arms and general tactics; the 2d course, further instruction on general tactics; and the 3rd, the military operations of Armies and Fronts, the problems of preparing military districts for war operations, and the conduct of war. Operational art and strategy were in the future to be the main themes pursued at the Academy..."¹⁹

Frunze died in 1925 and M.N. Tukhachevskii became Chief of Staff with K. Ye. Voroshilov becoming Peoples Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. In November of 1925 the Red Army Military Academy was renamed the Frunze Military Academy.

In 1925, a number of high ranking Soviet officers, among them Tukhachevskii and Zukov, traveled to Berlin in order to study the methods used by the German Reichswehr to train General Staff officers.²⁰

Order No. 390 of 12 July 1926 concentrated all functions relating to defense of the country and preparation of the army for war in the Red Army Staff. The idea of a "Greater General Staff" was proposed by Svechin and also by Shaposhnikov.²¹

By 1936 the reforms that would form the basis of the modern Soviet system were in place. The Commissariate for Defense of the USSR, the precursor of today's Ministry of Defense, was established on 20 June 1934. The Red Army Staff was formally changed to the General Staff in September of 1935 and on 11 April of 1936 the General Staff got back its own General Staff Academy.²²

Unfortunately Stalin's purges of the late 1930s eliminated many of the best minds of the Soviet armed forces on the eve of World War II at a time when they were most urgently needed. General of the Army S. M. Shtemenko understated it in his comment that, "it was a great misfortune for our army and our country as a whole that on the eve of the war we were deprived of many of our experienced military leaders."²³

Due to this unfortunate circumstance the first class of students of the new General Staff Academy had to be graduated early to fill the vacancies created by the purges. Although this made rapid advancement in rank possible, it was a very tough school to learn in and many did not survive the experience. The

Academy ran short courses throughout the war to train the needed General Staff officers and it was not until 1946 that the Academy returned to a more or less normal two year course.²⁴

A major organizational change occurred in 1958. The Higher Military Academy named for K. Ye. Voroshilov became the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR.²⁵

OFFICER EDUCATION IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR

The Soviets have generally succeeded in overcoming their earlier problems caused by a generally poorly educated officer corps. Today the Soviet Union runs the worlds most extensive network of military schools.

It is estimated that there are between 720,000 and 960,000 officers in the Soviet Armed Forces today. In order to maintain this force there must be a cadet population numbering close to 160,000 at any one time of which about 40,000 must be commissioned each year.²⁶ The military student population of the military academies and higher courses is estimated at some 50,000 with an additional 50,000 staff, faculty, and support personnel. This totals at between 390,000 and 470,000 personnel in the military-educational system. This number does not include the extensive civilian para-military training system, of which there is no counterpart in the United States.²⁷

Formal military education begins with the 143 premilitary schools of 3-, 4-, and 5-year duration which lead to the commissioning of officers. These schools, unlike the U.S. service academies which only attempt to provide cadets with a general military education and leave job specific training until after commissioning, attempt to produce a newly commissioned officer fully capable of performing his initial duties in his specialty when first assigned to his unit.

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Beyond these there are advanced courses for officers of up to 11 months duration, the best known of which is the "Vystrel" combined arms commanders course, and then 19 military academies, roughly equivalent to CGSC in the U.S., but of three to five year duration instead of 9 months. Three general types of academy exist: command, specialized, and composite. There is no "up or out" policy for the Soviet officer corps so not all officers will compete for nor attend one of these academies. One must, however, be a graduate of one of these academies if one hopes to progress on to high rank. Only about twenty to twenty-five percent of the officer corps will attend a military academy. Only officers under 32 years old, who are graduates of military schools and have served 2 to 3 years as company commanders are eligible. The most prestigious, the Frunze Military Academy of the Ground Forces, is an exception in that it will accept officers up to 38 but they must have 4 years command. This academy is also one of the research centers for Soviet military science. These military academies are specialized so officers attend an academy of his

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
branch or service.

Each major command is given a quota for each academy so there is keen competition for the few vacancies available. Selection is dependent on scoring high on comprehensive exacting examinations which normally eliminate two-thirds of the applicants. At the Frunze Academy, for example, the examination covers mathematics, physics, language, literature, tactics, and military equipment. It is recommended that officers spend from two to three thousand hours, or the equivalent of three hours per day, seven days a week for two years studying in preparation for the examination. The examination may be attempted up to three times.³⁰

Much of the instruction at the academies is by lecture, field exercise, group discussion, and individual study. Each student must prepare, present, and defend a thesis on a definitive military subject before a board of officers prior to graduation.

Upon graduation from an academy an officer goes onto a special list, the "nomenklatura," from which he will be assigned to positions which are only allowed to be filled by officers from this list. The basic list, from which officers receive directed assignments, is prepared by the Ministry of Defense.³¹

Higher level refresher courses are offered periodically by many of the service academies and may run from 10 to 12 months. This system of long formal educational courses broken by assignments in command and staff positions insures the Soviets that high level commanders maintain contact with the field and have experience at each level of command.



* Attendance at the advanced courses for officers or the higher academic courses is not a prerequisite for further schooling.

DDI 268012-75

Structure of officer training for the Soviet Armed Forces.

At the highest level in the Soviet military-education system stands The Military Academy of the General Staff (Voyennaya Akademiya General'nogo Shtaba) of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the Name of K. Ye. Voroshilov. It is located in Moscow and its course is two years in duration. Attendance is limited to those specially selected officers from all the services who are "being prepared for top level positions in the Ministry of Defense, command and staff positions with large groups of forces, fleets and other major commands."³²

"Approximately 100 to 150 officers of the rank of colonel and major general are selected yearly by the Main Directorate of Personnel of the Defense Ministry. Candidates must have had at least 2 years experience as commanders or staff officers of large commands and must be graduates of a command type program of a military academy."³³

It has been estimated that about half the Academy's students are alumni of the Frunze Academy.³⁴ This is hardly surprising, as in addition to being a center for theoretical research in military art and science, it is the foremost school of the Ground Forces and the Soviet Union is primarily a land power. Between twenty-five and fifty general officers are assigned there as staff and faculty.³⁵

Between fifty and seventy-five generals and admirals are assigned to the General Staff academy as staff and faculty where

extensive research on military subjects is conducted. The prime purpose of the General Staff Academy, however, is "preparing cadres for working in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, in large formations and formations of all services of the Armed Forces." ³⁶

THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE USSR

The Soviet Armed Forces General Staff has no equivalent in the United States. As we have seen its closest equivalent may have been the pre-World War I German Army General Staff. The Soviet General Staff is a carefully selected, well trained and highly educated elite taken from all the Armed Forces. Its impact upon the Soviet Military is monumental and pervasive. It encompasses work that in the U.S. would require the entire Department of Defense, Federal Emergency Management Agency and numerous private study groups and think tanks. ³⁷

The General Staff possesses executive authority and functions as the main agency of the "Stavka" of the supreme high command in time of war. Its main directorates are: operations, intelligence, organization and mobilization, military science, communications, topography, armaments, cryptography, military assistance, and the Warsaw Pact. ³⁸

Most General Staff positions are "nomenklatura." The key

positions are held only by graduates of the General Staff Academy. Although they come from all branches and services the General Staff officers are seldom parochial in outlook since once assigned to the General Staff an officers future depends upon how he performs for the General Staff.

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ENDNOTES

1. John Erickson, The Russian Imperial/Soviet General Staff, College Station Papers 3, (Published jointly by the Center for Strategic Technology, Texas Engineering Experimental Station, of the Texas A&M University System and Defence KStudies of the University of Edinburgh in Edinburgh, Schotland, April, 1981), p.1.

This is the best history of the Soviet/Russian General Staff I have been able to locate. Unfortunately it only goes to 1935. An addition taking the history from 1935 to the present was to be undertaken but was evidently never completed.

2. Ibid, p.2.
3. Ibid, p.11.
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8. Ibid, p.20.
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13. Ibid, p.24.
14. Ibid, p.53.
15. Ibid, p.65.
16. Ibid, pp.77-78.
17. Ibid, pp. 81-82.
18. Ibid, p.89.
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23. S.M. Shtemenko, "The Officers of the General Staff and Their Work," in The Soviet Art of War, edited by Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, (Bolder, Colorado, Westview Press, Inc., 1982), p.107.

24. Scott and Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, p.354.

25. Ibid, p.354.

26. Christina Shelton, "The Soviet System for Commissioning Officers," in Air Force Magazine, 1981, p.55.

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30. Scott and Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR, pp.351-352.

31. Ibid, p.152.

32. Taylor and Prissofsky, p.25.

33. Ibid, p.25.

34. Shelton, p.60.

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37. Ibid, p.354.

38. Ibid, p.103.

39. Ibid, pp.108-109.

CHAPTER 4

THE UNITED STATES ARMY GENERAL STAFF

BACKGROUND

As in the cases of the German and Russian General Staffs, the U.S. Army War Department General Staff system grew out of a military reform movement resulting from somewhat less than splendid campaign performance. In America's case this was the near tragic display of military incompetence during the Spanish-American War. This war was the catalyst that propelled the Army from the outmoded thinking and informal arrangements of the nineteenth century into real reform of its staff and officer education system.¹

If the military reforms undertaken in the U.S. Army were not of the depth and breath of those undertaken in Prussia after 1806 it may well be due to the fact that the war with Spain was not a debacle for America of anywhere near the magnitude that Jena-Auerstadt was for Prussia. In any case the reforms were, for America, significant. The American equivalent of the Prussian

reformers would have to include Emory Upton, Stephen Luce, William Harding Carter, Tasker H. Bliss, J. Franklin Bell, and perhaps most importantly, Elihu Root. And, as with their Prussian and Russian counterparts, they built upon and modified many already existing systems to achieve their goals. Also, like their counterparts, they were not able to achieve all they set out to accomplish.

The time was right for reform of more than just the military in America and this helped change the system. America was becoming urbanized. Urbanization brought with it the requirement for honest and efficient civil service, law enforcement, fire protection, and bureaucracy. The old spoils systems were on their way out. The frontier was closed and Americans were beginning to realize they were part of a world of interactive nations whether they wanted to be or not. The concepts of professionalism were growing throughout the public sector.

The concepts used to reform the Army's command and staff system were based largely upon the Prussian model, with some peculiar American characteristics thrown in. As early as 1868 Stephen Luce, having founded the Naval War college, was calling for a "Chief of the General Staff" for the Navy.² Emory Upton, who had studied foreign staff systems extensively, was greatly impressed by the Prussian system and recommended consolidating the offices of the Adjutant General and Inspector General as a first step toward creating a true General Staff.³ Ltc. Carter, who became Root's military tutor and assistant Adjutant General, was a true

reformer and staunch advocate of a real General Staff and much more efficient officer education system.⁴

Once created the new War Department General Staff, and the professional military education system designed to support it, almost immediately began to take on a distinct American flavor that increasingly deviated from the Prussian Generalstab and Kriegsakademie upon which they had been modeled. The American system never managed to maintain its focus on the preparation and planning for war and became increasingly involved in administration. Clearly defining the role and responsibility of the individual institutions within the fragmented educational system has remained a problem.⁵

The American general staff system reformers encountered some very unique American problems as well as some which were very similar to many encountered by their European predecessors. One unique American problem was that of the strong, well entrenched and politically influential bureaus and their respective chiefs. The 19th century American Army was divided into the "line" and "staff." The staff consisted of ten departments or bureaus, each with its own chief. The bureaus dealt mainly with matters of procurement and supply. Conflict between the line and simiautonomous bureaus was frequent. These powerful bureaus strongly resisted any form of change or reform that threatened their power and autonomy.⁶

"Officers were assigned to the bureau permanently, and the

chief of bureau remained chief until removed by death or extreme disability. Resident in Washington, these tenured chiefs cultivated strong congressional ties with which the relatively short-termed Secretaries could not compete."⁷

Some other problems were not so unique to the Americans alone although their root causes may have been. One of these has been the more or less continuous distrust on the part of some members of the congress of a professional military.⁸ Much of this distrust of a professional standing army naturally comes from the colonial experience with the personal armies of the European Monarchs. These armies were swept away by the French Revolution, out of which arose the mass popular conscript armies of modern times, designed to involve the people in the defense of their nation. As was pointed out in the brief history of the Imperial Russian and Soviet General Staffs, the Tzar and later communist leadership also distrusted education and professionalism in the officer corps as possibly constituting a threat to the State, Monarch, or Party.

Another similar American and European problem dealt with the level of education and training in the officer corps. Although American officers probably had a higher overall civilian educational level in 1900 than their Russian counterparts, nevertheless a severe problem in the American Army, "was the lack of a body of officers educated and trained to plan and solve problems from the perspective of the Army as a whole."⁹

The solution to the problem of providing the Secretary with a

non-parochial staff was the creation of a War Department General Staff. This was basically accomplished when the second General Staff bill was approved, on 14 February 1903,¹⁰ authorizing forty-two officers be detailed to the General Staff Corps. However, unlike in the Prussian system, officers would not be permanently appointed to a General Staff Branch.¹¹

The responsibilities of the War Department General Staff were far broader than those of the German Grosse Generalstab. Responsibilities performed in Germany by the War Ministry were to be performed in America by the General Staff. The Chief of Staff of the Army was to be the equivalent of the German Chief of the General Staff, but in addition to war planning and war fighting, the American General Staff, under direction of the President and Secretary of War, had supervision over all troops of the line and the administrative staff and supply departments. Similar to the German model the General staff was to have a Truppengeneralstab component with the units in the field and a Grosse Generalstab in the War Department.¹²

In order to solve the problem of training and educating officers to serve on the War Department General Staff, a combination of existing schools and the addition of a new institution would be put in place to serve as the equivalent of the Kriegsakademie in training General Staff officers. General Order Number 155 of 27 November 1901, began the establishment of the educational system that was to chart the path to professionalism for the U.S. Army Officer Corps.¹³

At the lowest level officer schools were to be established on every post to train officers in basic skills. Next in line would be the school at Fort Leavenworth where the existing Infantry and Cavalry School would be redesignated as the "General Service and Staff College." This school would train officers for the Truppengeneralstab. At the highest level and educating officers for the Grosse Generalstab would be the new Army War College to be built at Washington Barracks in Washington D.C. This two level system in America. Fort Leavenworth and the War College, were to accomplish what the single three-year Kriegsakademie did in Germany. However, unlike the German Kriegsakademie whose sole purpose was to train select, highly qualified officers for the General Staff, the War College was to be a direct adjunct to the General Staff. It was to study war, educate officers, design and war game plans, and carry out studies as requested by the General Staff. In effect the Army War College was a department of the War Department General Staff.¹⁴

The first students were chosen for Fort Leavenworth by the War College Board in 1902. As should have been expected they were not up to the work. The second class of 1903-04 was better.¹⁵ Experience soon demonstrated, however, that a one year course was insufficient and that Fort Leavenworth needed to expand to two years. This was approved and the General Service and Staff College was divided into an Infantry and Cavalry School which later became the "School of the Line" and, for distinguished graduates, a second year "Army Staff College."¹⁶ The two year course remained in

effect for most of the time until the Army began mobilization for World War II.

The students selected to attend the new Army War College were to be promising majors and captains selected by the Chief of Staff with preference being given to Leavenworth Staff College graduates. As at Leavenworth, the students tended to be a disappointment. The first class was that of 1904-05.¹⁷ Most students of the pre-World War I college were line officers who tended to lack formal education and professional competence. This problem continued so that in 1914 the War Department published new regulations tightening entrance requirements. These new rules required entrance examinations for Army candidates who were not graduates of the Staff College with the exception of the one technical service officer admitted each year. This helped for a while, however the problem of student qualification has continued¹⁸ to resurface throughout the War College's history.

The first officers to serve in the War Department General Staff were chosen by a board of six general officers in April of 1903. This had to be done until the General Staff Corps System¹⁹ became self-sustaining.

Thus by 1904 the U.S. Army had in place a system that, in theory at least, had all of the elements of the German system. It had a Chief of Staff, although without the full executive authority the German Chief enjoyed and with far broader responsibilities. There was a General Staff Corps divided into a Greater General Staff and a Troop or Line General Staff, to which

officers were, however, only detailed rather than assigned. A professional education system was in place designed to support and sustain the Staff. The Corps was generally untrained, the education system primitive in comparison to the Kriegsakademie, and the selection criteria extremely lax compared to German standards, but the U.S. Army was beginning to march along the long road toward professionalism.²⁰

By 1917 entrance examinations, tighter screening and an increasing availability of Staff College graduates were improving the quality of General Staff Officers. The Army War College preparing officers for the duties of the General Staff in campaigns and for the higher command. General Staff officers were working on plans to insure that the problems encountered in the Spanish-American War would not reoccur.²¹ But, even greater new and unforeseen problems were on the way.

The War Department General Staff performed the functions of a Greater General Staff "adequately if not well."²² Unfortunately there was nothing in the American system analogous to the German War Ministry to handle administrative matters or coordinate, "the still independent-minded bureaus."²³

In 1910 a conflict had arisen between the Adjutant General, Fred C. Ainsworth and the Chief of Staff, Major General Leonard Wood, that was to have long term consequences for the Army General Staff. Wood had reorganized the General Staff to increase efficiency and in so doing had strengthened its control over the bureaus. This precipitated the conflict between Ainsworth and Wood

which came to a head in 1911 and resulted in court martial charges against Ainsworth and his retirement.²⁴ Unfortunately this was not where the matter rested. General Wood happened to be a Republican. In 1910 the Democrats had gained control of the House. James Hay, a rural democrat who distrusted standing armies and General Staffs in general but Republican Chiefs of Staff in particular, became the head of the House Military Affairs committee. The Congress soon began to demonstrate hostility toward the General Staff. The fact that the General Staff then recommended closing some military posts, in order to increase efficiency by consolidating some of the widely scattered units, only served to make matters worse. By the Appropriations Act of 1912, "Congress reduced the General Staff Corps, already ridiculously small by European standards, from forty-five to thirty-six officers."²⁵

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 1916

In 1916, while World War I raged in Europe, James Hay struck, introducing the bill that became the "National Defense Act of 1916." Under this Act the General Staff Corps was allowed to increase from thirty-six to a total of fifty-four but this was only to be accomplished over a four year period and only half could be stationed in Washington. In effect the General Staff in

Washington went immediately to a total of nineteen officers. Furthermore the Act prohibited "the General Staff from interfering with the bureaus or in administration."²⁶ Neither instructors nor students of the War College were allowed to be members of the General Staff Corps.

In May of 1917, the realities of U.S. involvement in a World War finally hit home. The Congress lifted the ceiling on the strength of the War Department General Staff allowing it to grow during the course of the war to a thousand, largely untrained officers. With this corps the U.S. Army planned, mobilized, moved an army to France, and fought the American Campaign in Europe. Considering its size, age, and professional level of education the performance of the General Staff in World War I should not be judged too harshly. The near total unpreparedness of the United States for war in 1917 rests, in reality, as well as²⁷ Constitutionally with the Congress and the President.

When the unexpected and uncoordinated volume of contracts from all sources nearly swamped industry, causing the Great Winter Crisis of 1917-18, the War Department General Staff was given executive powers to deal with the crisis and establish control. Never before nor since has an American General Staff had as much power vested in it as it may have had during this period. In any case, after this, the need for a General Staff Corps and for trained and educated staff officers was never seriously questioned. How much authority the General Staff should wield and how it should be constituted and organized has been a rather

constant matter of concern however.²⁸

After the war it was the hope of many in the Army, that profiting from the lessons of the war, a strong General Staff could be maintained and even improved upon. The shadow of James Hay remained, however, and the Congress decided to reestablish its full control over the Army and its General Staff.²⁹

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 1920

The Congress passed the "National Defense Act of 1920," which incorporated some of the lessons learned from the war in Europe and was to be the basic directive for the Army until 1947. The act made the assumption that future wars would be fought by mass armies, and thus a mobilization system and rapidly expandable Regular Army was required, but it made no provision for universal military peacetime training. Under the act, the "Army of the United States" consisted of the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve Corps. A single promotion list replaced the branch lists. The authority of the General Staff was reduced by again removing the bureaus from its control and giving responsibility for procurement and industrial mobilization to the Assistant Secretary of War. The act did put some teeth into the selection criteria for officers detailed to serve in the Brain of the Army.³⁰

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"The high command called for by the scheme underlying the act was embodied in the General Staff, or more accurately, in the General Staff Corps. While officers were not permanently assigned to the General Staff Corps, as was the German practice, detail to the General Staff Corps was highly selective and tightly controlled through the means of a 'general staff eligible list.' The law required that to be selected for this list an officer had to successfully progress through the General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth (admission to which was highly selective in itself) and then be selected by a board of officers. To serve on the War Department General Staff, the act required graduation from the General Staff College (Army War College) at Washington Barracks. Failure to be selected for the "general staff eligible list" meant a future career limited to regimental level duties."³¹

The provisions of the National Defense Act of 1920, as they applied to the General Staff, were implemented by War Department General Order Number 48 of 12 August 1920.³² It was under the basic provisions of this act that the U.S. Army developed the General Staff which planned for and successfully fought World War II. In 1922, while Pershing was Chief of Staff, the school at Fort Leavenworth's name was changed to the "Command and General Staff School." The school was given the mission of training Troop General Staff officers through the level of the Army Corps, and the term was reduced to one year.³³ It became quickly apparent,

however, that one year was totally insufficient and in 1927 it returned to a two-year course, where it remained until increased General Staff officer requirements for mobilization forced it back to a one-year course in 1935-36.³⁴

It was also realized that one year at the War College was insufficient to teach operations of field armies, army groups, and theater operations as well as all the requirements involved in "preparation for war." Rather than expand the War College to two years, the Army Industrial College was opened in 1924 with the mission of training officers in military and industrial mobilization. It was intended that the Army Industrial College would be on the same level as, and equivalent to, the Command and General Staff School, this however further fragmented the General Staff educational system as officers did not attend both schools.³⁵

During World War II and the immediate postwar period the current structure of the U.S. military establishment evolved. The wartime changes, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and unified combatant commands, were not then incorporated into law.³⁶ The leadership of the Armed Forces appear to have been reasonably satisfied with General Staff performance during World War II, with the exception of joint and combined operations. To fill this gap an additional school was created in the form of the twenty-one week "Army and Navy Staff College" activated, in June of 1943, under supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁷ In order to further rectify this problem area, after the war in 1946, General Eisenhower agreed to the abolishment of the Army War College and

the founding of a joint "National War College" in its place. The National War College was established on 4 February 1946 in the Army War College building at Washington Barracks, now renamed Fort Mc Nair, and in April the Army Industrial College was transferred to joint control with a status equal to the National War College. The educational system was further fragmented when the Navy view won out, over General Eisenhower's, in which the Army and Navy Staff College, now renamed the "Armed Forces Staff College," was not made a prerequisite for attendance at the joint war colleges and was to stress "staff" over "command and staff." To make matters worse, the Army quota for the National was only thirty and for the Industrial War College only fifty-seven students. This meant that, in effect, the one-year Leavenworth course had to teach what a pre-war two-year Leavenworth and one-year Army War College course had taught in order to produce sufficient officers for Army General Staff requirements. It was clearly inadequate.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

The National Security Act of 1947 then changed many of the basic operating systems and underlying premisses that the Armed Forces had been operating under since the acts of 1916 and 1920.

It provided for a National Military Establishment consisting of an Army, Navy, and Air Force. The War Department was renamed the Department of the Army, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a strength not to exceed one hundred officers, was put on a statutory basis. However, as indicated at the beginning of this study, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were prohibited from becoming a true Armed Forces General Staff by the act, as amended.³⁹

The act was amended in 1948 to strengthen the position of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of Defense replaced the National Military Establishment, and a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was established. The Joint Staff was expanded from 100 to not more than 210 officers and the service Secretaries lost their cabinet rank and seats on the National Security Council. Significantly the act did not place any educational nor qualification requirements upon selection of officers for service on the Joint Staff. There were no positions designated throughout the Armed Forces which were to be filled only by general staff qualified officers. The services were left, more or less, on their own as to how they trained and educated their officers.⁴⁰

In order to fill the obvious gap in the Army education system the U.S. Army War College was officially reestablished by General Order Number 4 on 1 February 1950 at Fort Leavenworth. In 1951 it moved to its present home at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. It was decided that the new Army War College program would be broader than that of its predecessors but not as deep. It was to

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concentrate on army matters, and not try to duplicate or overlay the joint colleges. Unfortunately the gap between the Command and General Staff Course and the War College continued to grow wider. The War College, inspite of its avowed emphasis on the "preparation for war" and the "conduct of war," increasingly moved into international affairs, security policy and joint planning systems. It was a problem that could only be overcome by increasing the time officers spend on professional education.⁴¹

In 1955, the Baxter Board recommended that officers attending the National War College first be select graduates of their own service war colleges. In 1956, a board headed by General Bolte also recommended that the Joint Chiefs establish selection criteria for the joint colleges and that those selected for the joint colleges be graduates of their own service war college. The 1956 Williams Board recommended extending the Army War College to two years. None of these recommendations were acted upon by the services.⁴²

Since 1955 selection of officers for attendance at the Command and General Staff School and the Army War College has been made by centralized board action.⁴³ The basis upon which the boards select officers is based primarily upon evaluation of previous duty performance as reflected in the Officer Efficiency Report. U.S. Army officers are no longer required to take a formal examination for admittance to advanced military schooling, and very few are eliminated for substandard academic performance once admitted.

THE DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958

By this act the joint staff was increased to 400 officers and the authority of the Chairman over the joint staff was increased while the unified commanders were provided full operational command. The role of the separate services was reduced to basically a support function. In this fashion the Joint Chiefs of Staff were relieved of the old problem of administration that continuously vexed the old War Department General Staff.⁴⁴ With passage of this act the system, as we know it today, was basically in place.

Some educational reform was undertaken, to help fill the still existing wide educational gap and bring about a little more coherence in the system, with implementation of some of the recommendations of the Review of Education and Training of Officers (RETO) study of 1978. The study recommended that the Command and General Staff Course concentrate on operations at division level and below and that the Army War College deal with corps level and above (what we now know as the operational level). A 9-week Combined Arms and Service Staff School (CASS) was established, at Fort Leavenworth, with a mission not unlike the earlier School of the Line, but with much less time to accomplish it in.⁴⁵

In spite of these improvements the gap remains, primarily in the critical area of "Operational Art," an area in which, "as the Soviets point out, no matter how good the tactics are, if the operational plans are no good, you lose."⁴⁶ The Professional Development of Officers Study (PDOS), still shows that the U.S. Army does considerably less professional education and training of its officers than do the other nations, with the exception of Canada, in the RETO study. Officers of the Soviet Armed Forces enjoy a 2.7:1 ratio over American officers in time spent on professional military education.⁴⁷

The potential to fill the Army's educational gap may already exist in the form of the "School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)," a one-year long add on to the Command and General Staff Course at Fort Leavenworth, with the mission to furnish the Army with senior officers who are expert in the art and science of military operations, and who possess the character and attributes required to be successful commanders and general staff officers. The course leads to the award of a Masters of Military Arts and Science (MMAS). For the past several years approximately 48, primarily combat arms, officers have been selected from the resident Command and General Staff Course to attend for an additional year the Advanced Military Studies Program. These officers are selected from student volunteers by the CGSC Directors Board. Of the students selected for the 1986-87 class most are from the combat arms, four are from service support branches and four are from the military intelligence branch. The

Pre-Reto Officer Training Structure

12-16 WEEKS

OFFICER
BASIC
COURSE

21-27 WEEKS

OFFICER
ADVANCED
COURSE

9 MONTHS

COMMAND AND
GENERAL STAFF
COLLEGE

9 MONTHS

ARMY
WAR
COLLEGE

Post-Reto Officer Training Structure

PRECOMMISSIONING

LIEUTENANTS' TRAINING

CAPTAINS' TRAINING

FIELD GRADE TRAINING

MQS I →

MQS II →

MQS III →

12-19 WEEKS

ROTC

USMA

OCS

RESTRUCTURED
OBC

OAC

20 WEEKS

CORE

MOD

MOD

MOD

6 WEEKS

MOD

MOD

MOD

9 WEEKS

CAS³

9 MONTHS

CGSC

4-11 WEEKS

BN/BDE
PCC

9 MONTHS

SENIOR
SERVICE
COLLEGE

9 MONTHS

AMSP

proposal has been made to expand this course to 90 students each year. At this time the Advanced Military Studies Program remains no more than a potential gap filler as, although these graduates initial assignment upon graduation is supposed to be division or corps staff, they receive no new Military Occupational Specialty or Additional Skill Identifier and are soon lost in the system.⁴⁸

In addition to the Army educational gap just mentioned there are other notable problems in the system which inhibit a true professional U.S. Joint General Staff Corps, these are:

- Lack of clearly defined and designated General and or Joint Staff positions which can be filled only by General and or Joint Staff qualified officers. This must be done at the "Troop General Staff" level as well as the "Greater General Staff" level, or one can make no sense of the career pattern of trained officers nor the role of the various schools in the system. "There is now no systematic means for assuring that AFSC graduates ever get joint duty assignments."⁴⁹ In addition to clearly defining the qualifications required for these positions, this would, for the first time, give the military an idea of how many of these highly and specially trained officers the school system needs to produce each year at each level. This is vital, "because it costs from \$25,000 to \$75,000 or more to send an officer through AFSC (5-month course) or NDU (10-month course), these schools should not be treated simply as alternatives to their Service 'equivalent' schools."⁵⁰ There is a "General Staff Insignia" in the

U.S. Army, but it is virtually meaningless as it requires no special qualifications to wear.

- There is no stringent selection system to choose the "best and the brightest" for the brain of the army. Our selection boards remain a reflection of ourselves and reward "field time" far above academic achievement and intelligence. In this respect time spent in formal education can become a career liability. Of the 225 officers selected to command at the battalion level on the 1986-87 list only three did not serve with troops as a major. ⁵¹

Unfortunately for some there are not enough troop positions. For example, approximately 850 Armor majors are competing for 158 S3 or XO positions. Assuming an 18 month average tour length, this number of positions provides the opportunity for only 80 percent of Armor majors to return to battalion-level duty. This is further complicated by nominative assignments, functional area

requirements, and longer stabilized tours. On top of it all

MILPERCEN assigns to installation only. Once at an installation:

⁵²
it's catch as catch can. The U.S. Army remains one of the few modern western armed forces which still does not test its officers for field grade promotion or advanced military schooling. ⁵³

The U.S. Army remains one of the few also that does not insist upon study, much less mastery, of a foreign language on the part of its senior officers, yet at the same time insists it is serious about

fighting as a part of a coalition. An elite exists, whether it is an elite chosen by the boards, battalion command, and war college selection, or an elite of the intellect. A tough selection system

is not foreign to the U.S. Army, as we have seen, the Army has tested officers for admission to General Staff schooling and maintained a "general staff eligible" list between the World Wars.

- There is a lack of cohesion and direction in the professional education system. Part of this appears to be a lack of a clear concept and definition as to what each school's exact roll and mission is within the overall system. Part of it is the lack of a true General and or Joint Staff Corps for which these schools are supposedly educating officers. Most Joint Staff officers come to Washington directly from field assignments and have no experience or training for the complex issues in the joint arena.⁵⁴ Attendance at one's service equivalent Command and General Staff Course is not a prerequisite for attendance at the Armed Forces Staff College, so many students there cannot be considered truly qualified for higher staff in their own service. Most service's CGSCs are nine-months, the Armed Forces Staff College is five. An officer receives no ASI or MOS from his service CGSC, but gets a "3H" ASI from AFSC. Attendance at AFSC is not a prerequisite for attendance at the National War College nor is prior attendance at one's service war college. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces was put in place to deal with military and industrial mobilization, but being attended primarily by service support branches has the effect of separating the logistics "doer" from the operational "planner." The National War College was to be the top "Joint Service School" yet its courses

have moved more towards strategy, national policy, and politics to the point that it teaches little more, if any, joint military operations than any of the other service war colleges, and far less purely military operations.⁵⁵ There is no clear track that one can discern that one should take through the educational system for a specific career. Currently, there is no personnel management system that ensures that graduates of the three joint colleges of the National Defense University actually serve in joint duty assignments. AFSC graduates initially assigned to joint positions were; 1982 - 36 percent, 1983 - 40 percent, and 1984 - 63 percent. In 1984 - 17 percent of NWC and 15 percent of ICAF graduates were initially assigned to joint positions.⁵⁶

- Relating to the areas of quality and egalitarianism, has been the strong tendency of the U.S. Armed Forces to prefer, at times, quantity over quality or to accept the less capable rather than have a vacant position. This is one of the most striking differences between the Prussian/German system and the American. American military school systems very seldom eliminate anyone for substandard academic performance. On the otherhand under the German system: "Quality always had priority over quantity and substance over appearance in an army which gladly rejected candidates after one, two or even three years at the War Academy."⁵⁷ With the continuous praise one hears of todays high quality soldier one would hope the armed forces have learned a valuable lesson. But whether that lesson will prevail in harder times and whether that lesson is only to be applied at the enlisted level

remains to be seen. There also seems to exist, among the American Military, a strange anti-intellectual and anti-professional education streak which is not found in other sectors of American society, such as doctors, surgeons, engineers, physicists, airline pilots or air traffic controllers. One thing seems certain, a high quality army with a dynamic doctrine requires operationally competent commanders and key staff officers to lead it, if it is to execute that doctrine effectively.

In 1982, General Jones, USAF, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote an article entitled "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change." More Criticism of the Joint system soon followed when General Edward C. Meyer, USA, then Chief of Staff of the Army voiced similar criticism. Public criticism of the system such as this lead to examination of these and other problems. This resulted in the formation, during May of 1985, of a Task Force Defense Organization to study the problem. On 16 October, 1985, the Committee staff's 645-page study, entitled "Defense Organization: The Need for Change" (Senate Print 99-800), was publicly released.⁵⁸

One of the study findings was, "the inadequate quality of the OJCS staff." It cited three dimensions of quality: "(1) the inherent skills and talents as professional military officers; (2) the necessary education and experience; and (3) a sufficiently long tour to become effective and to provide continuity." the report goes on to say that, "In his book, 'A Genius for War'⁵⁹

Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, USA (Retired) states that the objective of the Prussian General Staff was to institutionalize excellence (page 24). Whatever the real or imagined deficiencies of the General Staff concept, it is clear that the OJCS staff is at the other end of the spectrum; at best it can be described as the institutionalization of mediocrity."⁶⁰

Two of the possible solutions to the above suggested in the report were: "Option 2G - establish in each Service a joint duty career specialty"⁶¹ and, "Option 2H - establish a General Staff in place of the current Joint Staff."⁶² In making this latter recommendation the report cited Secretary Schlesinger's testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services:

..."At the close of World War II, we sought, above all, to avoid the creation of a dominating general staff - reflecting a fear of the German General Staff, that revealed both a misreading of history and a susceptibility to our own wartime propaganda. Whatever the paramount position of Ludendorff in Imperial Germany during World War I, the German General Staff in World War II had little power to control or influence Hitler's regime. Moreover, the issue was quite separate from that of unification, for the German General Staff controlled only Germany's ground forces. In any event those concerns, whether real or invented, bear little relevance to the conditions of today and bear all the earmarks of another era. (Part 5, pages 186 and 187)"⁶³

This brings us to the present.

THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF
1986

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was enacted as Public Law 99-433 on 1 October 1986. The implementing general order as it concerns the Joint Staff has not yet been published. The manner in which this significant piece of legislation is to be implemented is still being studied. This act presents the Department of Defense with an outstanding opportunity to greatly improve the overall professionalism of the Armed Forces and correct many of the problems and inconsistencies noted previously. The act increases civilian direction over the military and at the same time greatly increases the authority of the Chairman, however the prohibition against the Chairman exercising military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces is retained, as is the prohibition against the Joint Staff functioning as an Armed Forces General Staff.⁶⁴

The act raises the number of members allowed on the Joint Staff to 1,627.⁶⁵

"Selection of officers of an armed force to serve on the Joint Staff shall be made by the Chairman from a list of officers

submitted by the Secretary of the military department having jurisdiction over that armed force. Each officer whose name is submitted shall be among those officers considered to be the most outstanding officers of that armed force. The Chairman may specify the number of officers to be included on any such list."⁶⁶

"The secretary of Defense shall establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps on the active-duty list who are particularly trained in and oriented toward, joint matters (as defined in section 668 of this title). Such officers shall be identified or designated (in addition to their principal military occupational specialty) in such manner as the Secretary of Defense directs. For the purposes of this chapter, officers to be managed by such policies, procedures, and practices are referred to as having, or having been nominated for, the 'joint specialty.'"⁶⁷

"The secretaries of the military departments shall nominate officers for selection for the joint specialty. Nominations shall be made from among officers-

(A) who meet qualifications prescribed by the Secretary of Defense; and

(B) who-

(1) are senior captains or, in the case of the Navy, senior lieutenants; or

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(11) are serving in the grade of major or lieutenant
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commander or a higher grade."

"An officer who is nominated for the joint specialty may not be selected for the joint specialty until the officer-

(A) successfully completes an appropriate program at a joint professional military education school; and

(B) after completing such program of education, successfully completes a full tour of duty in a joint assignment."⁶⁹

Furthermore:

"The Secretary of Defense shall insure that approximately one-half of the joint duty assignment positions in the grades above captain or, in the case of the Navy, lieutenant are filled at any time by officers who have (or have been nominated for) the joint specialty.

The Secretary of Defense shall designate not fewer than 1000 joint duty assignment positions as critical joint duty assignment positions. Each such position shall be held only by an officer with the joint specialty."⁷⁰

Also:

"The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that-

(1) unless waved by the Secretary in an individual case,

each officer with a joint specialty who graduates from a joint professional military education school shall be assigned to a joint duty assignment; and

(2) a high proportion (which shall be greater than 50 percent) of the other officers graduating from a joint professional military education school also receive assignments to a joint duty assignment as their next duty assignment."⁷¹

The act also sets minimum joint duty tour lengths at three years for general officers and three and one-half years for other officers. In addition it requires joint officers be promoted at a rate not less than officers in the same armed force and in the same grade and competitive category. Each selection board shall also have a joint officer as a member. Upon expiration of a specified grace period;⁷²

"An officer may not be selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half), unless the officer has served in a joint duty assignment."⁷³

In addition:

"Each officer selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier general or, in the case of the Navy, rear admiral (lower half) shall be required, after such selection, to attend a military education course designed specifically to prepare new

general and flag officers to work with the other armed forces." ⁷⁴

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CHAPTER 5

PRODUCTIVITY

"Productivity is a ratio of some measure of output to some measurement of input."¹ It is normally thought of as having two major components. "Effectiveness," generally refers to achieving certain defined results or outcomes without regard to the cost of achieving them. A sledgehammer will kill flies, it is therefore effective. It is also a gross misallocation of resources. If your only object is to kill flies and cost is no object, you are operating on an effectiveness only criteria. "Efficiency," on the other hand, refers to achieving any given result with the minimum expenditure of effort required to achieve that result.² Quality of output is normally part of both and is measured by various standards.

"Productivity asks both whether a desired result was achieved (the effectiveness question) and what resources were consumed to achieve it (the efficiency question)."³ The purpose of these efforts is to get improved yield out of allocated resources. "Productivity improvement in the public sector is a goal because public sector activities are difficult to measure. In many cases the costs of measurement may be so prohibitive that they outweigh the benefits."⁴ Never-the-less, productivity is a

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SHOULD THE UNITED STATES ARMY HAVE A PROFESSIONAL
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS 1963-A

cost and efficiency of government is increasingly forcing productivity improvement on an often hostile environment.

In the period 1960-1975, output per man-hour in the U.S. increased an average of 3.3 percent a year. Not bad, but this is compared to: 10.4% in Japan, 6.4% in Italy, 6% in France, 5.8% in Germany, 4.3% in Canada and 3.9% in the U.K.⁵ Annual rates of change averaged over multiyear periods (%) for the U.S. business sector are: 1946-1966, 2.7; 1966-1973, 1.6; 1973-1978, 0.7; and 1978-1982, 0.1%.⁶

Four factors affecting the productivity problem are:

- "-Advances in knowledge (and our inability to keep pace)
- Decline in R&D investments and spending
- Decline in capital technology ratios per worker, i.e., the substitution of labor for capital, and
- Decline in the relative levels of commitment, participation, and motivation of individual workers and work groups to work quality, productivity, and innovation."⁷

All are hotly debated, but whatever the cause productivity problems have become a national concern.

Given the dimensions of the problem, productivity improvement is now recognized as one of the most critical elements in sustaining effective organizational performance. The public sector, and that includes the military, is a part of, not apart from, the national economy. In fact, the public sector is one of the largest, and fastest growing, components of the U.S. economy.⁸ Resources absorbed by the public sector cannot be used for

production by the private sector. Therefore, as the public sector absorbs an ever increasing portion of the nation's available resources, its productivity performance becomes increasingly important to the nation's well-being.

While it is easy to see what the public sector is consuming, it is harder to measure what it is producing. Regardless of these speculative issues, the Army must recognize that productivity improvement is expected of it by the public and the Congress. The 1986 Defense Act requires improved productivity. Its intent is "to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense."⁹ At the same time it mandates a "reduction in personnel assigned to management headquarters activities and certain other activities."¹⁰ Army Secretary John O. Marsh Jr. said changes would result in a 15 percent reduction in the Army's military and civilian staffs at the Pentagon, eliminating 548 jobs.¹¹ This is on top of the Congressionally mandated officer cuts of 22,700 from all services before Oct. 1, 1989,¹² fixed end strengths, and declining Defense Budgets.

There are five major sources of productivity growth:

- "-Application of knowledge. E.g., introduction of technology, such as ADF.
- More capital per worker.
- Higher quality of labor. i.e., improved worker job performance through training, education, and motivation.
- Improved allocation of labor, and

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-Economies of scale."

Because the military is much more labor intensive than manufacturing and other sectors, less opportunity exists to increase productivity through the employment of more capital and technology. Also, in this labor intensive sector we do a poor job in institutional arrangements for inducing individual productivity. We cannot increase the pay of a major who performs excellent work over that of a major who only does average work. Most productivity improvement measures fall in the area of management rather than labor. The Army's leadership can improve productivity in the staffs to a degree through automation, but the cost of the automation must then be taken into account. For example, if an automatic car wash were installed in a government motor pool operation, human resources might be reduced, output raised and productivity per unit of human resources input substantially increased. Yet the car wash may have been so expensive, relative to benefits derived, that the financial value of the output compared to the financial cost of all the relevant input has decreased. The military might also contract out more planning and studies, thus decreasing or increasing man-hours needed to generate output, and artificially affect the measured level of productivity. The problem is that the military needs trained proficient staffs which can perform equally well in a battlefield environment, with little fixed automation and no handy beltway bandit contract study firms, as they do in the Pentagon.

It would appear that the most promising area for military

staff productivity improvement remains in the area of higher quality labor. This would seem to require better selection, training, education, and management of General Staff officers.

The previous chapters outlining the history and methods of selecting, training, educating and managing German, Soviet, and American General Staff Officers were researched for several purposes:

- To dispel some of the misinformation, superstition, ignorance, and apprehension concerning the concept of the General Staff.

- To illustrate the fact that the U.S. Army once had a functioning General Staff, modeled largely upon that of the German's.

- In order to show the methods and procedures that set the German General Staff apart from, and made it superior to, copies in other nations.

- To illustrate the demanding standards set for, and the education and training lavished upon, the General Staff Officers of our main "competition," the Soviet General Staff.

- To provide examples from history, for those who must now remodel the U.S. system in order to conform to the provisions and spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, that they do not have to reinvent the wheel, but may profit from that history.

- And finally, to illustrate alternative systems for maximizing staff labor. In the end it all comes down to enhancing

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

1. The U.S. Army had a General Staff and supporting system from 1903 until World War II.
2. This General Staff possessed most of the elements contained in any true General Staff system:
 - a. a system for selecting General Staff officer candidates,
 - b. a school system to train and educate General Staff officers,
 - c. a trained and educated General Staff Corps,
 - d. a troop or line and a greater General Staff between which General Staff officers rotated, and
 - e. a Chief of Staff.
3. The American Army and its General Staff functioned well, although not as efficiently as its German counterpart. Its shortcomings in comparison to the German system were:
 - a. far less rigid standards of selectivity for General Staff officers than those practiced by the Germans,
 - b. a far more shallow, less extensive, and cohesive supporting educational system under the control of the General

Staff,

c. lack of a General Staff Branch with the requisite comprehensive personnel management policies,

d. the lack of executive authority with all the prestige, authority, direction and leadership command entails,

e. it became a staff of "generalists" rather than a "generalship staff," and became involved "in matters beyond the traditional grosser Generalstab functions of strategic planning, combat developments, military education, and force readiness,"¹ and

f. it contented itself with having a large number of shallowly trained and educated officers rather than fewer who were educated in greater depth.

4. Whatever the merits or deficiencies of the War Department General Staff, the system was virtually destroyed by the evolved changes after World War II and the National Security Act of 1947. Since then no coherent system has been put in place to replace it. Rather new has been piled upon old without apparent clear thought as to how the entire system is to operate and to what part each piece plays in supporting the whole.

5. Dissatisfaction with the demonstrated performance of the Defense Department since World War II, has caused the Congress to mandate reform in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This act, although it falls short of requiring a true General Staff and probably gives too

much emphasis to joint operations at the expense of equally important coalition operations, does virtually require some form of professional Joint/General Staff Corps. This will probably require, as a minimum, the return to something much like the "general staff eligible list."

6. This act provides the services with the opportunity to now make meaningful and much needed reforms which would have the potential to greatly increase the professionalism of the Armed Forces and their competitiveness in relation to the Soviet Union. Or, the services can attempt to do the minimum required, put patches on the current system, and hope the Congress buys it.

7. For the U.S. Army to make any meaningful reforms will require extensive changes in both education and personnel systems as well as changes in the way we think. If the Army chooses not to make these changes, it appears, that senior Army commanders and their staffs will become, more and more, amateurs in a world of stringently selected, highly trained and educated professionals. U.S. Army units may still remain tactically proficient, but be poorly served at the operational and strategic level.

8. In order to close the education gaps that currently exist as well as train and educate officers in depth for combined and joint operations, plus, at the higher levels, teach national policy, strategy, how the Army works, preparation for war and conduct of

war, there appears no alternative to increasing the total time spent in formal professional military education. Individual school roles and missions will have to be modified and the clearly defined and delineated. If, as appears to be the case, the Army cannot see its way clear to greatly increasing time spent in school for all its officers, it will have to selectively educate and manage a select few.

9. The Army will have to become highly selective and discriminating in choosing its future Joint/General Staff officers at the senior captain/junior major level. It will then have to provide them the extensive professional education to do their complex jobs and, at the same time protect them from the boards who demand "field" soldiers over highly skilled "staff" officers.

10. Critical positions should be designated from division or brigade on up which can only be filled by these Joint/General Staff qualified officers. This would, for the first time, provide the Army an exact figure as to how many of these highly qualified officers the system had to produce. It would also allow for rotation between the Troop General Staffs and the Greater Joint General Staffs. In order to manage these officers effectively in the personnel system, as it currently exists, these officers would, at a minimum, require a separate MOS, and should preferably belong to a separate non-accession General Staff Branch.

11. Col. William O Staudenmaier stated that; "There is an obvious necessity for cohesion and coherence among the elements of the national military strategy, the coordinative military strategy and the operational military strategy. This unity does not come easily. One reason is the absence of a comprehensive military theory."² Col Ball also quotes a Research Analysis Corporation opinion that the Army could not continue to "hire out its staff work" and that "An organization can lose its decision making authority if it lacks the means to make those decisions."³ Unfortunately I can see little hope that the U.S. Armed Forces will soon be able to successfully compete with the Soviets in this area. This is due to our 30-year retirement system, that has the effect of eliminating our senior officers just at the point where they have gained the experience and ability to think in depth at this level. And to the Congress, which has demonstrated the unwillingness to even allow the services the officers they think they require to perform day to day missions, much less have sufficient capability to allow senior officers up to two-year tours of duty at a war college for theoretical thinking and writing, as is Soviet practice.

12. Finally, I do not believe that the Congress will completely succeed in having the services assign their first class officers to the Joint Staff as long as that body is viewed as only an advisory body, off to the side, and with no real power. The important jobs in the U.S. Armed forces are those with command

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authority. Unless the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman are provided executive authority and placed in the chain of command they will remain impotent and and staffed with less than the best and the brightest. I do not believe that a true Joint General Staff would in any conceivable sense constitute a threat to American democracy. When all is said and done it is the American officers ethics and oath to the Constitution which has preserved that democracy. As civilian control of the military in the U.S. is assured, but does not assure against civilian militarism, so bypassing the Joint Chiefs assures nothing but impotence and continued confusion in the overall direction of the Armed Forces.

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CHAPTER 7

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the United States Army form a Joint General Staff Branch, composed of select high quality officers, in the rank of major, graduating from a two-year long Joint General Staff course.
2. That this two-year long Joint General Staff Course be composed of the one-year long resident Command and General Staff Course conducted at Fort Leavenworth plus, for some graduates, an additional year at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, and for an additional group, an additional year at an expanded Armed Forces Staff College teaching the operational level of war as well as joint operations.
3. That these two-year long courses be designated as "The Joint General Staff Academy of the American Armed Forces."
4. That this corps of Joint General Staff Officers be kept relatively small and highly select in order to ensure that exceptionally high quality is maintained.
5. That only the top graduates of the resident CGSC be selected

for attendance at the second year course leading to induction into the Joint General Staff. If only the best 40-50 percent, based on demonstrated performance, as attested to by OERs and carefully selected by centralized board are chosen, as advertised, for attendance at resident CGSC, then choosing only from among the top academic graduates for the second year should assure selection of the "best and the brightest" to be the future "brains of the Army and Department of Defense." The use of academic standing in the CGSC, will add the long absent additional discriminator of examination for selection of General Staff candidates in the U.S. Army, while avoiding the usual reason put forward of heavy duty requirements precluding study and thus excusing substandard professional knowledge in the American Officer Corps.

6. That the Army designate positions in all combat command headquarters, from division to field army, which may only be filled by Joint General Staff qualified officers. This would give the army a clear idea, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense designated Joint positions, of exactly how many of these highly qualified officers it had to produce each year. At division level the present two ADC positions should be eliminated and the Chief of Staff position be made a brigadier general slot. The G-3 should become a Colonel slot with the deputy G-3 a Lt. This would clarify the chain of command and restore the primacy of operations.

7. That upon graduation from the two-year Joint General Staff Academy, and induction into the Joint General Staff Branch, these officer's assignments alternate between service line General Staff positions and the Joint Staff positions designated by the Secretary of Defense in the DoD, JCS, and Combatant Commands. The only exception should be for command duty when the officer would revert to his original branch. This will help ensure maintenance of branch and service qualification.

8. That the National War College be designated as the top level school of the U.S. Armed Forces. That it be attended only by officers selected, or recently promoted to general or flag rank. And, that graduation from their respective service war college, whose primary task should be instruction in "the preparation for war" and "the conduct of war" in their service, or the Industrial College of the Armed Forces be a prerequisite. This would qualify general and flag officers to serve in select critical joint and general staff positions, at their level, while remaining masters of the art of war in their own service.

9. That the assignment of all Joint General Staff Officers be reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10. That upon implementation of these, or similar, programs designed to guarantee the production and sustainment of a high quality Joint General Staff, the service chiefs return to Congress

in order to request modification of some of the requirements, such as the three and one-half year minimum joint tour and absolute requirement to have served in a joint capacity for promotion to general officer, which are in all probability unworkable.

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